









Thesis Advisor: W.Max Woods
rhesis
J54965




REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations
and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-
0188) Washington DC 20503.
1 . AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
September 1996
3
. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
TITLE AND SUBTITLE AAW Effectiveness of the DD-963 Spruance
Class Destroyer: An Analytic Approach
6. AUTHOR(S) Richard O.Johns, LT, USN
FUNDING NUMBERS






SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Warfare Assessment Division, P.O. Box 5000, Corona CA 91718-5000
Naval 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
1 1 . SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVATLABrLITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
1 3 . ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
A typical naval ship has multiple systems which can be used to defend itself against a cruise missile threat. These systems may
consist of surface-to-air missiles, MK 45 guns and the Close-in-Weapon-System to name a few. Until recently each of these
system's effectiveness against a cruise missile was assessed independently of the other systems onboard the ship. The purpose of this
thesis is to develop an overall system effectiveness model for the DD-963 Spruance class destroyer. The model considers the
integration of the defensive systems onboard, the availability and reliability of these systems, and contains parameters that can be
ued to incorporate the crew's ability to employ the various weapon systems against a cruise missile threat.







CATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified






NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102
11
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
AAW EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DD-963 SPRUANCE CLASS
DESTROYER: AN ANALYTIC APPROACH
Richard O.Johns
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.E.E., Villanova University, 1988
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of







A typical naval ship has multiple systems which can be used to defend itself against
a cruise missile threat. These systems may consist of surface-to-air missiles, MK 45 guns
and the Close-in-Weapon-System to name a few. Until recently each of these system's
effectiveness against a cruise missile was assessed independently of the other systems
onboard the ship. The purpose of this thesis is to develop an overall system effectiveness
model for the DD-963 Spruance class destroyer. The model considers the integration of the
defensive systems onboard, the availability and reliability of these systems, and contains
parameters that can be used to incorporate the crew's ability to employ the various weapon
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Today the cruise missile has become the weapon of choice for many of the countries of
the world. Greater range and sophistication have allowed platforms to covertly launch the
missiles and allow the target less reaction time when defending itself. As the cruise missile
threat continues to improve and becomes more lethal, the challenge to build more effective and
capable defensive systems increases as well. With the attack on the USS Stark in 1987 by an
Exocet cruise missile, greater emphasis has been placed on measuring the effectiveness of
defensive systems against anti-ship cruise missiles.
The typical naval ship has many systems to defend itself against a cruise missile threat.
These systems consist of both active and passive measures that attempt to either destroy the
missile (active) or deceive the missile by luring it away from its target (passive). Typical active
measures are surface-to-air missiles, MK 45 5754 guns and the Close-in-Weapon-System
(CIWS). The MK 36 Decoy Launching System (DLS) launches chaff as a passive defense
against a missile threat. Until recently, each of these system's effectiveness against a cruise
missile was assessed independently of the other systems onboard the ship. With this approach it
is difficult to determine an overall effectiveness against a given threat. The technique used to
calculate the effectiveness of the ship in defending itself should incorporate the integration and
the common equipment shared among individual systems.
This thesis develops an analytic model to assess the overall effectiveness of the DD-963
Spruance class destroyer against an Exocet cruise missile threat. The model considers the
detection capabilities, availability, reliability, and kill probabilities of the defensive systems
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onboard as well as the readiness and training of the crew to initiate an engagement against the
incoming threat. Availability of a component is defined as the probability that the component is
operational (up) when called upon to function. The reliability of a component is the probability
that the component remains up throughout the duration of the engagement. System state
availabilities and reliabilities are computed using definitions of the system states and well known
rules of probability algebra. The model considers distance at which the missile is first detected,
the range of the threat at the time of launch, and the capability of the crew to launch (fire) the
weapons in specified range intervals after detection. The configuration of the combat system,
the firing policy and other weapon performance parameters are also employed in the model.
The analysis used to develop this model is not unique to this ship class. Given an
integrated system diagram, a model for the AAW effectiveness of classes such as the CG-47,
LHD-2, LPD-17 and many others can be developed following baseline concepts used in this
methodology.
Due to the number of parameters contained in the model and the variability they may
induce, enumeration of the model with parameter values chosen ad hocly but professionally
were used to display a few of the relationships between parameters. An indepth study into the
sensitivity of the model to various combinations of parameter values is needed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the anti-ship cruise missile over 20 years ago, the Navy has spent
large amounts of time and money on defense against this formidable threat. As the cruise
missile threat changes and becomes more lethal, the challenge to build more effective and
capable defensive systems increases as well. Since the attack on the USS Stark in 1987 by
an Exocet cruise missile, greater emphasis has been placed on measuring the effectiveness
of defensive systems against anti-ship cruise missiles. System effectiveness in this thesis
is the probability that the threat does not hit the ship.
The typical naval ship has multiple systems which can be used to defend itself
against a cruise missile threat. These systems consist of both active and passive measures
that attempt to either destroy the missile (active) or deceive the missile by luring it away
from its target (passive). Typical active measures are surface-to-air missiles, MK 45 5754
guns and the Close-in-WeaponSystem (CIWS). The MK 36 Decoy Launching System
(DLS) launches chaff as a passive defense against a missile threat. Until recently, each of
these system's effectiveness against a cruise missile was assessed independently of the other
systems onboard the ship. With this approach it is difficult to determine an overall
effectiveness against a given threat.
A. PURPOSE
This thesis develops an analytic model to assess the overall effectiveness of the
DD-963 Spruance class destroyer against an Exocet cruise missile threat. The model
considers the availability, reliability, kill probabilities of the defensive systems onboard and
the readiness and training of the crew to initiate an engagement against an incoming threat.
The model also considers the distance at which the missile is first detected, the range of the
threat at the time of launch, and the capability of the crew to launch (fire) the weapons in
specified range intervals after detection. The configuration of the combat system, the firing
policy and other weapon performance parameters are also employed in the model. The
model has reliability, availability, and single shot probability of kill parameters which must
be specified to compute an overall system effectiveness number in the interval (0.0, 1.0).
Availability of a component is defined as the probability that the component is operational
(up) when called upon and reliability of a component is the probability that the system
remains up throughout the engagement.
n. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the analytic model, one must be familiar with the various
systems employed by a Spruance class destroyer against a cruise missile. The Navy uses a
layered defense that is referred to as "defense in depth." This means that the ship engages
a threat with its longest range weapon first and as the missile approaches, the remaining
weapons are employed as their engagement range allows. As mentioned previously, the
Spruance class destroyer can defend itself with both active and passive systems. The active
systems in order of their effective range are:
SLQ-32A (V)3 Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
NATO Seasparrow Missile System (NSSMS)
MK 45 5754 Gun System
Close-in-Weapon System (CIWS).
The SLQ-32A (V)3 system passively detects enemy electronic emissions from
targeting sources and missiles for identification, early warning, threat detection, and for
support of other warfare missions [COMNAVSURFLANTINST C3516.6D]. In the case
of a missile, the SLQ-32(V)3 will detect missile seeker activation, alert the operator, and
report the missile line of bearing. The system uses a radiated beam of energy in an attempt
to disrupt the missile's seeker from effectively targeting the ship.
The NSSMS is a surface-to-air missile system designed to destroy enemy aircraft and
missiles threatening the ship. The system consists of a the MK 95 Radar, MK 91 Fire
Control System (FCS), and the MK 29 launcher containing eight missiles. Once launched,
the missiles guide to the target using reflected energy from the MK 91 FCS. The missile
also uses this energy to determine the arming and detonation timing for the warhead.
The Spruance class destroyer has two MK 45 5754 guns located on the forecastle
(forward) and fantail (aft). These guns are unmanned and fire a variety of projectiles that
destroy the missile using a blast fragmentation warhead. The guns are controlled by the
Control Officer Console (COC) operator located in the Combat Information Center (CIC).
From this console he can designate one or both guns to the target and select the type of
projectiles to be fired.
Finally, the CIWS is the ship's last line of defense or point defense system. The
system has a stand-alone search radar or can be sent initial targeting data from other
shipboard sensors. Once the target is within range, CIWS fires hundreds of rounds, literally
a wall of metal, at the incoming target.
The SLQ-32(V)3 is both a passive detection and active weapon system. It detects
missile seeker activation and alerts an operator of the threat. The operator then employs a
transmitter that emits a beam of energy that attempts to neutralize the missile's seeker before
it can impact the ship.
The lone passive system employed by the Spruance class destroyer for its defense
is the MK 36 Decoy Launching System (DLS). Prior to missile seeker activation the ship
launches rounds of chaff which reach a predetermined altitude and explode deploying
thousands of pieces of foil. This chaff region or "cloud" will appear larger in radar
cross-section than the destroyer and is designed to lure the missile away.
In order to successfully employ the defensive systems, the threat must be initially
detected at a sufficient range. A few of the systems that are capable of detecting an inbound
cruise missile are the MK 23 Target Acquisition System (TAS) Radar, AN/SPS-40, and
MK 95 NSSMS Radar. These systems are air search radars that detect airborne contacts and
pass target location data to the defensive systems. The farther the initial detection the more
weapons that can engage the threat and the more time the crew has to make decisions




The task of developing a system effectiveness equation that accounts for the
integration of the many defensive systems described earlier and other factors such as training
and crew capability is complicated. This task is more manageable if the following
assumptions are made.
1) The threat will be a single Exocet missile approaching the ship from the
starboard side so that only one CIWS mount (MT 21) will engage the target.
2) The ship has been alerted that an Exocet threat is present, therefore the ship's
captain will likely use only a few system configurations.
3) The ship is only capable of engaging the target once with each of the weapon
systems using a designated firing policy; e.g. shoot-shoot policy.
4) The capability of the NSSMS missile, MK 45 5754 gun and the MK 36 DLS
to destroy or deceive the target is dependent on the range at which these
systems are employed (launched, fired etc.). This is in turn dependent on the
range at which the target is initially detected.
5) The ability of the crew to initiate an engagement at a particular range, given
the range at which the threat is detected, varies from crew to crew and ship to
ship. The crew's performance will be taken into account stochastically.
6) Each weapon system's single shot probability of kill is independent and has no
influence on the single shot probability of kill of any other systems
7) The reliabilty of all system components, except the NSSMS missiles, MK 45
rounds, and the chaff are equal to one given the component is available (up) at
the start of the detection scenario. Reliabilities of the three cited exceptions are
accounted for in the system effectiveness equations.
B. DEFINITIONS
I: Maximum detection range of the missile by the ship for a given threat.
Ij! i* detection sub-interval of I with I, being the sub-interval nearest the
ship, i = 1,2, ..., I.
States j* combat system state, j = 1, 2, ... , J.
Detect^: Event that threat is detected in sub-interval I; given configuration State^
To account for the possibility that the NSSMS, MK 45 guns and MK 36 DLS may
be dependent on range, each system has engagement sub-intervals which may or may not
coincide with the detection sub-intervals. These sub-intervals will span the maximum
detection range I and may be uniform in size for each system. Figure 1 illustrates how the
detection and engagement intervals, i and m respectively, may look for the NSSMS.
Similar intervals, g and c, exist for the MK 45 gun and chaff respectively.
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Figure 1 depicts the relationship that detection intervals (I) and engagement
intervals (m) may have during a detect—to—engage sequence. Notice the
intervals may be different in size and overlap depending on the weapon system.
Let
Lmj : Event that missiles are launched when threat is in missile interval m
given Statej where m = 1, 2, ..., M.
Gun^: Event gun initiates firing when threat is in gun interval g given Statej
where g = 1, 2, ..., G.
Chaff
cj : Event that MK 36 DLS (chaff) engagement is launched when threat is
in chaff interval c given Statej where c = 1, 2, ..., C.




Event that component i is available (up) at the start of the detection
process and stays up throughout the scenario.

E; : Event that component i is not available at the time it is needed during
the scenario.
Eo|Detectjj = event that the threat does not hit the ship given Detect^.
PNSSMSmj = probability NSSMS kills threat given Lmj .
PGUNgj = probability 5754 MK 45 kills threat given Gun^ .
PCHAFF
cj = probability MK 36 DLS deceives threat given Chaffcj .
PCIWSj = probability CIWS kills threat given Statej
.
PECMj = probability SLQ-32 electronic countermeasure path kills threat
given Statej
1. System States
The DD-963 Spruance class destroyer has many sensors that can detect an
inbound Exocet cruise missile and defensive systems that can be used against such a threat.
Appendix A depicts the various elements of what is termed the detect-to-engage capability
of the Spruance class destroyer. Appendix A shows the various detection elements, control
or information processing equipment and weapon systems that can play a part in the
detect-to-engage sequence. Because of the desire to detect the threat at a sufficiently large
range for a NSSMS engagement, only three system states are considered in this thesis.
These states differ in the availability of specific detection and control components and in the
source of the initial detection. Given that the components required in each state are
available, these three states would be preferred over any other detection path because of the
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longer initial detection range capability Figure 2 refers to these paths which are a subset




Figure 2 shows the three detection paths
corresponding to states 1,2, and 3. These
states differ in the component used for initial
detection of the threat. All of the detect-to engage
are displayed in Appendix A.
The probability of detection in any state in which these detection components are
unavailable multiplied by the probability that these elements are unavailable is very
small. For example, let Ej signify the event that component i is available and let A
;
denote the probability of Ej , i.e. the availability of E
s
If the MK 23 TAS and MK 95
NSSMS Radar (components 2 and 5 in Appendix A) are inoperable, the probability of
detection, Pd, with both of these components inoperative is very small. This is the result
of the MK 23 TAS and MK 95 NSSMS Radars being the primary detection sources for
the NSSMS. Multiplying Pd by the probability that these components are unavailable




As a result, all other detection states can be ignored.
Letting " * " denote "logical and", the general equation for Statej is
State* = SMj * SG * Sch * SE * Scms for j = 1,2, ... , J (2)
where S^ , SG , Sch > SE , and SCiws indicate that all components are available in the j* path
traversed during the NSSMS, MK 45 gun, MK 36 DLS, SLQ-32(V)3, and CIWS
engagement sequences respectively. Note in Appendix A that only the NSSMS path varies
with j. This is due to the use of different components for the initial detection of the threat
in the NSSMS engagement path. The probability of detection at distant ranges may be equal
for each of the states described below but allowing for the possibility that they are not will
yield a much more robust model.
a. Statej
Referring to Appendix A, State! uses the MK 23 TAS Radar without the Data
Processing Set (element 1) as the primary detection source for the NSSMS engagement path.
This is the preferred detection source for an anti-air defense based on recommendations
presented in the DD-963 Combat Systems Doctrine [COMNAVSURFLANT C35 16D]. The
equation for State! is given as
State | = Smi Sg Sch Sg SCiws (3)
SM i represents the components that contribute to the engagement of the Exocet in the
NSSMS path. Since the TAS Radar is linked directly to the NSSMS, the Command
12

Decision System (CDS, component 4) is not required for an engagement and is therefore
excluded from the equation for SMI . Since components 3, 8, 9, 10 and 1 1 send information
through the CDS, these components do not contribute to S^. Since E
;
denotes the event that
component i is available in a particular path, the equation for SM1 becomes
SM1 = E, * E2 * E5 * E6 * E7 (4)
The path selected for SG, Sen, SE , SCIWS are expressed as
SG = (E 10 ,E 11)*E22 *(E 13 ,E 14) (5)
Sch = (Eis , E21 ) * (E 16 , E 17 , E 18 , Ei9) (6)
SE = E8 *E21 (7)
Sciws = E20 (8)





the MK 23 TAS Radar DPS (element 2) is no longer available.
Because of the inability of the other detection sources to send data through the MK 23 TAS
Radar DPS, this leaves the MK 95 NSSMS Radar (element 5) as the initial detection source
for a missile engagement. State2 becomes








complement of E 2 , indicates that the MK 23 TAS Radar DPS is not available.
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Again the equations for SG, SCH, SE , SCIWS do not change with states.
c. State,
The MK 23 TAS Radar is no longer available to detect the Exocet missile.
Instead the data from the AN/SPS-40 Radar (element 3), an air search radar, is gathered by
the CDS and then forwarded through the MK 23 TAS Radar DPS to the NSSMS Radar
where the engagement takes place. In this instance State3 is defined as
State3 — Sm3 SG SCH SE ScrWs (11)
where
SM3 = E 1 * E3 * E4 * E2 * E5 * E6 * E7 . (12)
E,", complement of Eb denotes that the TAS Radar is not available.
2. Availability of the System States
Having defined the system states, the question of their availability must be addressed.
Let A; be defined as the availability of element i at the beginning of the detection process
and throughout the entire engagement sequence. The availability of each state, A(Statej),
can be calculated using the equations developed in the previous section. Since the system
states are mutually exclusive, we shall assume that
£ A(Statej) <= 1. (13)
;=i
14
a. A( State i)
Using equations (3) thru (8), the availability of State, can be represented
as
A(State,) = A(Smi) ' A(SG) • A(Sch) A(SE) • A(SCiws) ( 14)
where
A(SM,) = A 1-A2*A5*A6.A7 (15)
A(SG) = [(A 10-An ) + (AmT-Ah) + (A10.An
A




A(Sch) = [(A15-A21 ) + (A15
A
.A21 ) + (A15.A2D] • [A 174 + 3A 173-
(1-A17) + 6A172.(1-A172)] (17)
A(SE) = A8.A2 i (18)
A(Sciws) = A2o (19)
When attempting to understand equations (16) and (17) it may be helpful to refer to
Appendix A. Note that in the gun engagement path there are two ways to proceed to
element 23 This is referred to as a parallel path across components 10 and 11. There are
three combinations that are possible in order to cross over these components. Either both
components are or one or the other are available. These combinations are displayed
mathematically at the beginning of equation (16). The same concept was used to deal with
the parallel paths across both gun mounts in the gun path, the SLQ-32(V)3 and bridge
display consoles and chaff launchers in the chaff engagement path, Equation (17). Because
the SLQ-32(V)3 display console is assumed to be operational in equation (18), the
availability across both display consoles in the chaff path is equal to 1 and equation (17) can
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be rewritten as
A(Sch) = [A 174 + 3A 173- (1-A17) + 6 A172-(l-A172)] . (20)
b. A(State2)
Using equation (9) the formula for the availability of State^ is
A(StatC2) = A(SM2) • A(SG) .A(Sch) A(SE) • A(SCIWS) (21)
where
A(SM2) = (1-A2>A5.A6.A7 (22)
A(SG) = [(A10*An ) + (A 10
A




A(Sch) = [A174 + 3A173- (1-A17) + 6 A172.(l-A172)] (24)
A(SE) = Ag.A2 i (25)
A(SCIWS) = A2o • (26)
c. A(State3)
From equation (1 1), the availability of State3 is defined as
A(State3) = A(Sm3) • A(SG) • A(Sch) • A(SE) • A(SCiws) (27)
with
A(Sm3) = (1- AO-A3.A4.A2-A5.VA, (28)
and A(SG), A(Sch), A(Se), A(Scrws) are defined as before.
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3. PNSSMSmj
The probability that the target is destroyed by the NSSMS is dependent on how many
missiles are launched, missile launch probability, the missile performance reliability during
flight, and the probability that the missile kills the target at intercept. The MK 29 launcher
consists of eight individual cells having an equal probability of successfully launching a
missile. Let PL(i) be the probability that i missiles are launched while attempting to launch
two missiles. Assuming that the launcher is fully loaded, PL(1) is the probability that only
one of the eight available missiles can be launched. So,
PL(l) = 8Pm .(l-Pm)
7
(29)
where Pm is the common probability of successfully launching any one of the eight missiles.
Since the policy is to shoot two missiles, the probability of launching two missiles, PL(2),
is
PL(2) = 1 - [ PL(0) + PL(1)] = 1 - [(1 -PJ
8 + 8Pm . (1-Pm)
7
]. (30)
Assuming that a missile or missiles have been launched, the next step is to calculate the
probability that the NSSMS kills the target. Steigers [1993] alluded to the fact that the
Seasparrow missile will have a varying probability of kill depending on the range at
intercept. Because it is only powered for a portion of its flight, as the missile coasts toward
the target it loses some of its maneuverability. This results in a decrease in the probability
of killing the target. The actual probability of kill can be obtained from the six degree of
freedom simulations conducted at the Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake, Ca. Figure 3
shows a graphical representation of Pk versus percent maximum range of the missile. This
17

information can be used in this system effectiveness model.
PK vs. Range
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Range ( % of Maximum)
Figure 3
Figure 3 displays what a plot of Pk data for the j* state versus percent
of the maximum range of the Seasparrow missile might look like. The
data can be obtained from six degree of freedom simulations run at the
Naval Warfare Center China Lake Ca.
The probability of killing the target is written as
PNSSMSmj =[ PL(1) • Pk^ (1) • RJ + {PL(2)[ Pk^j (2) •V +
2Pkmj (l).Rm.(l-Rm)]} (31)
where Pk^ (i) is the probability of kill when i missiles are launched given the target is in
missile interval m at the time of launch and the system is in state j. This probability may
also be produced from simulations similar to those for a single missile. Rn, is the probability
that the missile performs properly in flight. Substituting Equation (29) and (30) into
Equation (3 1 ) results in
PNSSMSmj = {[8Pm.(l-P^.PkBrt(l).R 1I1 }+{l-[(l -PJ 8+8Pm.




In calculating the probability that the MK 45 guns destroy the target we assume that
the gun mounts operate independently and have equal probability of shooting a round
successfully, PG . The probabilities of shooting one or two rounds when attempting to shoot
two rounds are
P [ shoot 1 round] = 2PG • (1-PG) (33)
P [ shoot 2 rounds] = PG
2 (34)
Normally, a variable-timed fragmentation (VT-Frag) round is used against an air target. The
round is given a time setting based on the intercept range with the target and at the intercept
point explodes sending a "wall" of metal fragments toward the target. The probability that
the target is killed by a 5" round is highly dependent on the round operating as designed.
The accuracy of the targeting data provided by the system also impacts the Pkill , therefore
the configuration of the system must be taken into consideration. The probability that the
target is killed by the 5" gun mounts is dependent on the interval in which the engagement
is initiated and on the system state. This probability is derived similarly to that for the
NSSMS and is represented as





where Pkgj(i) is the probability that the target is destroyed when i rounds are fired given the
target is in gun interval g and the system state is j. R^ is defined as the reliability of a round
exploding at the predetermined range.
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5. PChaffcj
The Spruance Class destroyer is equipped with four individual chaff launchers each
containing six cells from which to launch a chaff round for a total of twenty-four. Assume
that the ships doctrine is to deceive an incoming threat by launching two chaff rounds. Let
Pc be the probability of launching a chaff round, then the probability of launching one or
two chaff rounds respectively is
P [ shoot one round ] = 24PC»(1- Pc)
23 (36)
P [ shoot two rounds] = 1 - [(1- Pc)
24 + 24PC«(1- Pc)
23
]. (37)
Let Re represent the reliability of a chaff round exploding at the correct height and Pk^j (i)
be the probability of deceiving the target when i rounds are launched assuming the target is













The CIWS, a point defense weapon, is the ships last defense against an incoming
threat. Due to the limited range of the CIWS, the assumption is made that this Pkm is




It is assumed that the probability of the SLQ-32 (V)3 "killing" the target is constant
throughout its effective range and that its probability may also be affected by the system
state j.
C. EQUATION DEVELOPMENT
In order to develop the equation for the effectiveness of the ship against an inbound
missile threat, it is necessary to understand the interrelationship between the various weapon
systems in terms of the common detection components they share. Figure 4, a summary
diagram of these relationships, shows two distinctive engagement processing paths. The
NSSMS, MK 45 guns, and the MK 36 DLS can be thought of as parallel paths because of
the numerous detection and control components each have in common. The CIWS and
SLQ-32(V)3 engagement paths are essentially stand-alone paths and have basically no





Figure 4 shows the two distinctive engagement processing paths. The
related path has many common detection and control components. The
stand—alone systems have nothing in common with the other systems
or each other.
When attempting to calculate the effectiveness of each of these systems given a detection
and an engagement interval, there are 23 - 1 = 7 combinations for the related path and
22 - 1 = 3 combinations for the stand-alone path. Rather than attempt to enumerate these
possible events, it is often easier to think of these events not occurring and reduce the
number of calculations to be made. A substantial factor in the effectiveness of a weapon
system is the capability of the crew to employ it effectively. In order to fully assess the
effectiveness of these systems, the crew's ability to respond to the threat and employ the
weapon systems at their maximum effective range must be considered. Factors such as
training, ability to handle stress, and many other intangibles can affect the crew's
proficiency. There are other factors as well that may affect the ship's ability to employ a
weapon within a given interval for a particular detection interval. All of these factors are
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lumped together in this model and are referred to as crew capability. Let PCREWM^j
,
PCREW_Ggij , and PCREWCH^ be the probability that the crew launches a missile, 5"
round or chaff in interval m, g, or c respectively, given the threat is detected in interval i
and the system is in state j.
Let Q ;j(M,G,C) be the probability that the NSSMS, MK 45 guns and MK 36 DLS
do not kill the threat in any of their launch intervals given the threat is detected in interval
i and the system is in state j . Qjj(M,G,C) is defined as
Qij(M,G,C) = (1-PkNSSMSijXl-PkGUNijXl-PkCHAFFij) (39)
where
PkNSSMSy = £ PNSSMSmj • PCREWJd^ (40)
m
PkGUNjj = £ PGUNg • PCREW_Ggij (41)
g
PkCHAFFij = £ PCHAFFcj • PCREW_CHcij (42)
e
Similarly, let Qj<CIWS,ECM) be the probability that the CIWS and SLQ-32(V)3 are
ineffective against the missile given system state j. Recall that the probability of kill for
these systems does not depend on the interval in which the engagement was initiated.




Multiplying this term by Qjj(M,G,C) gives the probability that none of the systems were
effective against the Exocet missile. Taking its complement, subtracting it from the certain
event, provides the probability that the system is effective (is not hit by the threat) given a
detection interval i and system state j. An expression for the probability that the ship
23
survives the attack given the threat was detected in interval i and the system is in state j can
now be defined as
P(E |Detectij,Statej)= l-Qij(M,G,C)«Qj(CIWS,ECM) (44)
Finally, equation (44) is predicated upon knowing what state the system is in and the
interval in which the initial detection occurred. This result must now be multiplied by the
probability that the missile is in fact detected in interval i and by the availability of system
state j to produce the overall effectiveness of the system for any state and all possible
detection intervals. That is, system effectiveness, the probability that a single Exocet missile
does not hit the ship, is given by
J N




With the model and the methodology behind it defined, the question of how the
model's various inputs affect the overall effectiveness of the DD-963 to defend itself needs
to be answered. Looking at the numerous parameters that are required to calculate an
answer and the variability that they may induce, lead to assessing only a few input sets.
Microsoft Excel 7.0 was used to enumerate the model using initial values specified in the
example shown in Appendix B
Initially the PkiU for both the 5" and chaff rounds is looked at to determine their
contribution to the effectiveness of the system. Maintaining the baseline inputs and varying
the Pkju of the rounds from 0.3 to 0.9 one at a time, results in a constant system effectiveness
curves in Figure 5
System Effectiveness vs Pkill of a Round
d ** o" ^ d "t d *! d •*: o $ do o o o o o
Pkill
Figure 5
Figure 5 represents the change in the system
effectiveness when the P^ for a chaff and 5"




Earlier the CIWS and the SLQ-32(V)3 were identified as "stand-alone" systems in
that they have very little components in common with each other or the other defensive
systems onboard. The ?m for these systems are modified to see their affect on the system's
effectiveness. The results for the CIWS are shown in Figure 6. Similar results are obtained
when working with the SLQ-32 which may be attributed to these systems operating in
"parallel" as shown in Figure 4.





Figure 6 displays the change in system
effectiveness as the P^ for the CIWS
changes.
The probability of detection plays a large part throughout the model and is therefore
the next parameter to be considered. The baseline values are used for all parameters with
the probability of detection for interval i being a variable. Probabilities of detection for the
farthest interval, i , and the next closest interval, i-1 , are used. For example, a probability





This is repeated for interval intervals i = 2 thru 10 with the results for two
combinations displayed in Figure 7.






















.2, i -2= .7




Figure 7 shows the change in the system
effectiveness when the initial detection
interval, i, and the next closest intervals,
vary.
Looking at Figure 7, the graphs are almost identical except for the interval where the
maximum effectiveness occurs. With detection possibilities in three intervals, the maximum
probability of survival for the ship occurs in interval five vice interval four for the dual
probability case.
Does the crew's ability to employ the ship's weapons affect the system's
effectiveness? The probability of initial detection is fixed in interval seven with a probability
27

of 0.1 followed by 0.2 in interval six and finally 0.7 in interval five. Case one represents a
crew that is well prepared to defend the ship against the Exocet missile. This equates to a
probability of firing a weapon in the same interval that the threat is detected, given the
weapon has a capability in that interval, of 0.9. The crew also employs the weapon in the
next closest interval with probability of 0. 1 . For this example, if the threat is detected in
interval seven the crew will fire the NSSMS, MK 45 guns and chaff in interval seven with
a probability of 0.9 and in interval six with a probability of 0.1. Case Two and Case Three
differ from the previous case in that they use different probabilities of employing the
weapons. Case two uses 0.7 for the probability of engaging the target in the same interval
it is detected and 0.3 for the next closest interval. Case three uses 0.7 for the probability of
engaging in the same interval that the threat is detected, 0.2 for the next closest interval and
0. 1 for the second interval closer than the interval of detection. The system effectiveness
results are shown in the table below.
Case! Case 2 Case 3
.943 .945 .936
These figures show that the crew's ability to employ weapons early in the engagement
process does have some affect on the probability that the ship survives a cruise missile




V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
Assessing the effectiveness of a ship's defensive systems against a cruise missile is
an issue that will be talked about for years to come. This thesis provides a model to assess
the effectiveness of integrated systems onboard a DD-963 Spruance class destroyer. It also
considers intangible factors such as the crew's ability to employ these systems and their
contribution to the success of the ship in defending itself.
An in-depth study into the sensitivity of the model to various combinations of
parameter values is needed. This could best be done by developing or using a computer
program in which these parameters can be varied to identify their affect on the overall
effectiveness of the system. Identifying key parameters can also be used to aid decision
makers when allocating funds for improvements in individual systems to increase the system
effectiveness.
Simulation methodologies are currently being developed throughout the Department
of the Navy and by civilian contractors to answer this question as well. The analytical
model in this thesis can be used as a tool to verify these simulations as well.
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APPENDIX A. INTEGRATED DETECT-TO-ENGAGE CAPABILITY
NSSMS Engagement Path
J^-r<^L>i-<^!
S"S4 MK 45 Engagement Path
















Figure 7 represents the DD-963 Integrated Self-defense
detect-to-engage capability [Zakka, June 1995]. In this
diagram the various paths from initial detection through
engagement are displayed. The index for the components




1 - MK 23 TAS Radar
2 - MK 23 TAS Radar with Data Processing Set (DPS)
3 - AN/SPS-40 Air Search Radar
4 - CDS Baseline 6
5 - MK 95 NSSMS Radar
6 - MK 91 NSSMS Fire Control System (FCS)
7 - MK 29 NSSMS GMLS (Guided Missile Launching System)
8 - SLQ-32(V)3 Receiver/Processor
9 - AN/SPS-55 Surface Search Radar
10 - AN/SPQ-9A Gun Fire Control Radar
1
1
- AN/SPG-60 Gun Fire Control Radar
12 - MK 86 Gun Fire Control System (GFCS)
13
-MK 45 5754 Mount 51
14 - MK 45 5754 Mount 52
15 - MK 36 Decoy Launching System (DLS) Bridge Control Unit




20 - Close in Weapon System (CIWS) Mount 21
21 - SLQ-32(V)3 Display Console
22 - MK 86 GFCS Control Officers Console
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APPENDIX B. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS EXAMPLE
The following example will compute only the term in the system effectiveness
equation (equation 45) that corresponds to detection in interval seven and system state one.
The remaining terms for system state one corresponding to other detection intervals would
be computed in the same manner. The same is true for system states two and three. A red
box will be used to highlight values used in the system effectiveness calculations. For
simplicity the engagement intervals for the NSSMS, MK 45 5754 guns and the MK 36 DLS
are the same as the detection intervals. This means that the intervals for each weapon system
coincide exactly with each of the detection intervals. The maximum detection range for the












next assumption is that all of the equipment for each of the engagement paths is available,





MK23TAS A-, = .98 MK 86 GFCS A-12 = 1
MK 23 TAS w/ DPS Aq=98 MT51 A13 =1
AN/SPS-40 A3 = .98 MT52 A-14 = 1
CDS Baseline 6 A3=.98 MK 36 DLS (BCU) A15 = 1
MK 95 NSSMS Radar A5=.98 Chaff Launcher #1 A-16 = 1
MK 91 NSSMS FCS Ag=.985 Chaff Launcher #2 A17 =1
MK 29 NSSMS GMLS A7 = .985 Chaff Launcher #3 A18 = 1
SLQ-32(V) 3 RCVR/PROC As =985 Chaff Launcher #4 A-19 = 1
AN/SPS-55 Ag =1 MT21 A20 =1
AN/SPQ-9A A10 =1 SLQ-32(V) 3 Display Console A* =1
AN/SPO60 An = 1 MK86GFCSCOC A22=1
Table 1
Table 1 represents the availability of the components used
;" the engagement paths of the various weapon systems.in
With this assumption the calculation of the availability of each state is calculated using






A(Saws ) 1 00
AfStafa^) 90
State? States
HSua) 0.02 A(Sm3) 0.02
A(SG ) 1.00 H$g) 1.00
A(Sch) 99 A(Sch) 0.99
A(SE ) 1.00 A(SE ) 1.00
A(Saws) 1.00 A(Saws ) 1.00
A(State2 ) 0.02 A(State3) 0.02
Table 2
Table 2 shows the availability of the components of
each state and the overall availability of the states as well.
The red box indicates that only State, will be used throughout
this engagement.
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From Table 2 we see that State, will be the only state in which the system will operate
because of the assumption that all of the equipment is available.
The next task is to define the probability of kill for each of the weapon systems given
the engagement is initiated in interval five. The probability of kill for the NSSMS, MK 45
guns and chaff depend on the reliability of the rounds, the successful firing of a round and
the probability of kill for each round. The numbers below represent hypothetical values.




















Table 3 lists numbers required to calculate the
Pui for NSSMS, MK 45 guns and chaff.
These values are used in equations (29) thru (38) to calculate the Pkill of each weapon system
given the threat is detected in interval i and the system is in state j. For simplicity the tables
for the MK 45 guns and chaff assume that each weapon system's single round performance
is constant throughout the intervals in which it is effective (i.e., no dependence on range)
and are also independent of state j. The Pkill's for the events that a single round or a two







State , State 2 State 3
1 0.29 027 0.25
2 0.48 0.45 0.42
3 0.61 0.57 56
4 0.41 0.39 0.36






















1 0.40 0.40 040
2 0.40 0.40 0.40
3 0.40 0.40 0.40
4 0.40 0.40 0.40

















State 2 State 3
1 0.40 0.40 0.40
2 0.40 0.40 0.40
3 0.40 0.40 0.40
4 0.40 0.40 0.40
5 0.40 0.40 0.40
6 0.40 0.40 40
7 0.40 0.40 0.40
8 0.40 0.40 0.40
9 0.40 0.40 40
10 0.40 0.40 0.40
Pkci (2)












Table 4 shows what the probability of kill for NSSMS,
MK 45 guns, and chaff might be for a single salvo or
dual salvo given a launch interval (m,g,c) and system
state j.
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Because Pkm of the CIWS and the SLQ-32(V)3 are assumed to be independent of
range, they are only affected by the state in which the system is operating and their Pkill 's










Table 5 represents the probability of
kill for CIWS and SLQ-32(V)3 given
system state j. Note these P^'s are not
dependent on the engagement interval.
The parameters needed to calculate the probability that the individual weapon
systems kill the target when launched in a given interval are now defined.. Substituting the
numbers presented in Table 3 into equations (29) and (30), the probability of launching a
single missile or a salvo of two missiles is given by
PL (1) = .0000007
PL (2)=1.00 .
Substituting values from Tables 3 and 4 as well as these results into equation (31), the




Interval (m) State-, State2 State3
1 0.41 0.39 0.36











8 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 6
Table 6 represents the probability that the NSSMS
kills the target when launched in the indicated
intervals.




Interval (g) State, State, State,
1 0.58 0.58 0.58











8 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00
PCHAFFq
Launch
Interval (c) State, State, State,
1 0.63 0.63 0.63
2 0.63 0.63 0.63











9 0.63 0.63 0.63
10 0.63 0.63 0.63
Table 7
Table 7 displays the probability that the
guns and chaff destroy the target when
launched in the indicated intervals.
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In equation (39) the probability that neither NSSMS, MK 45 guns or chaff destroy
the targets, Q^{M,G,C), is the complement of the product of the probability that they kill the





PkNSSMSij = £ PNSSMS raj • PCREW_Mmij
m
PkGUNjj = £ PGUNgj • PCREW_Gglj
g
PkCHAFFij = £ PCHAFF cj • PCREWj:^ .
c
In equations (40), (41) and (42) PCREW is introduced as a parameter to account for
intangible factors such as stress, sleep deprivation, and training that affect successful
employment of the weapon systems. The next step is to calculate the probability that any
one of the NSSMS, MK 45 guns or chaff is effective against the missile given weapons
are employed and the target is detected in interval seven. The PCREW parameters are
dependent on detection interval, engagement interval and system state. They are defined
as PCREW_Mmij , PCREW_Ggij , PCREW_CHcS for the NSSMS, MK 45 guns, and
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l4 0.8 0.8 0.8
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Table 8 represents the ability of the crew to employ the NSSMS
in intervals four, five, and six for detection intervals one thru ten.
For detection interval seven and launch interval five, PCREWM
is equal to 0.9 . This states that if the target is detected in interval
seven the weapon will be employed with probability of 0.9 in
interval five. In Table 6 the P^ for the NSSMS for launch intervals
farther than interval five is zero signifying the weapon has no
capability in these intervals. Launch interval five is the fust chance
for the crew to employ the weapon and thus results in a larger
number. Launch intervals less than five have values equal to zero
because the crew cannot launch in interval five if they haven't detected
the target yet.
The red blocks in Table 8 present crew launch probabilities for the NSSMS in launch
intervals for, five, and six given the target is detected in interval seven. For detection
interval seven and launch interval five, PCREWM is equal to 0.9 . This states that if the
target is detected in interval seven the weapon will be employed with probability 0.9 in
interval five. In Table 6 the P^ for the NSSMS for launch intervals farther than interval
five is zero signifying the weapon has no capability in these intervals. Thus, launch interval
five is the first chance for the crew to employ the weapon and kill the missile resulting in
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a larger probability. In Table 8 when launching in interval five, detection intervals less than
five have values equal to zero because the crew cannot launch in interval five if they haven't
detected the target yet. Using the expression defined above and values located in Tables 6
and 8, the probability that the NSSMS kills the threat given the threat is detected in interval
seven and the system is in state one is given by adding the cross products from Tables 6 and
8 for launch intervals six, five and four in that order to get
PkNSSMS71 = (0 • 0) + (.45 • .9) + (.55 • .1) = .46 .
Table 9 represents the probability of the crew firing a 5" round in intervals four, five,
and six for various detection intervals. The zeros in launch interval six signify that the crew
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Table 9 represents the probability of the crew firing a 5"
round in intervals four, five, and six for various detection
intervals. The zeros in launch interval six signify that the
crew will not attempt to fire a 5" round because the weapon
does not have a capability to engage the target in this interval.
41
From Tables 7 and 9, the probability that the MK 45 guns kill the threat given the threat
is detected in interval seven and the system is in state one is given by by adding the cross
products from Tables 7 and 9 for launch intervals six, five and four in that order to get
PkGUN71,= (0»0) + (.58-.9) + (.58*.l)= .58 .
Table 10 shows the probability of the crew launching chaff in intervals five, six, and
seven for various detection intervals. Using Tables 7 and 10, the probability of the chaff
successfully "destroying" the missile give it is detected in interval seven and the system is
in state one is
PkCHAFF71 = (.63 • .7) + (.63 • .2) + (.63 • . 1) = .63 .
LairhttErvai = 5
PCFB/VCH,











































I9 01 01 01
l«
Table 10
Table 10 represents the probability of the crew firing a
chaff round in intervals five, six, and seven for various
detection intervals.
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Given a detection interval and a system state, the sum across all engagement
intervals for each crew factor should be less than or equal to one signifying that the crew
may launch a weapon before the missile impacts the ship. The probability that neither
the NSSMS, MK 45 guns or chaff kill the target given they are employed, the system is
in state one and the target is detected in interval seven is given by
Q71(M,G,C) = (1 - 46)«(1 - .58>(1 - .63) = .084
The probability that the missile survives the CIWS and SLQ-32(V)3 is calculated
by
CMCIWS^CM) = (l-PCIWSO-O-PECM,)






Table 1 1 represents the probability that the missile
survives both the CIWS and SLQ-32 given state j.
Multiplying Q^CIWS^CM), the probability that CIWS and SLQ-32(V)3 do not
destroy the target, by the probability that neither the NSSMS, MK 45 guns or chaff kill the
target, Q71(M,G,C), and then taking the complement yields the probability that the ship
survives given the missile is detected in interval seven and engaged in interval five.
P(E |Detect71 , Stated = 1 - (.084 • .68) = .943
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This assumes the detection occurred in interval seven and that the system is in state one.
The probability that the missile is in fact detected in interval seven and the availability of
state one must now be taken into consideration. Table 12 displays what the probability of
detection might look like for the three system states.
P( Detect^)















Table 12 represents possible values for the
probability of detection given a particular
system state.
Using the probability of detection for interval seven from Table 12 and the
availability of state one from Table 2, the system effectiveness term in equation (45)
corresponding to interval seven and system state one is
(.943)»(.3>(.9) = .2546
To obtain the overall effectiveness of the ship, this process needs to be replicated and then
summed across all possible detection intervals and system states.
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